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was not vacated, and it was executed in the manner prescribed 
by section 675 of the Code of Civil Procedure. .As a sale 
under an execution issued on a satisfied judgment is void 
(Reynolds v. Lincoln, 71 Cal. 183 [9 Pac. 176, 12 Pac. 449] ), 
a fortiori an order for the issuance of an execution under a 
judgment which is satisfied; is likewise void. We believe it 
is clear that the satisfaction here involved was a sufficient 
acknowledgment by plaintiff that she had received from the 
defendant all of the property to which she was entitled un-
der the interlocutory decree of divorce. The orders for the 
writ of possession and payment of the sum of $66.50 were 
improper. [3] It cannot be said that the order for the 
issuance of the writ of possession included a determination 
that the satisfaction was not a bar thereto because, as we have 
seen, it was ex parte and defendant had no opportunity to be 
heard. The subject is tersely treated in Salveter v. Salveter, 
11 Cal . .App. (2d) 335,337 [53 Pac. (2d) 381], as follows: 
"The so-called order to issue an execution was, not a judg-
ment on the merits against, the plaintiff. It was . . . a di-
rection by the court to its clerk to issue the execution. It is 
a fundamental rule that a writ of executio,n must be founded 
on a valid and subsisting judgment' which has not been satis-
fied. (11 Cal. Jur. 43, and cases cited.) Payment of a judg-
ment satisfies it and extinguishes it. " 
In view of the foregoing conclusion it is unnecessary to 
consider defendant '8 further contention that the interlocutory 
decree did not sufficiently describe the permanent wave ma-
chine or mention the sum of $66.50. 
The order appealed from denying the motion to vacate the 
orders made by the trial court after the judgment was satis--
fied, is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., con-
curred. 
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NATIONAL RESERVE COMPANY OF AMERICA (a Cor-
poration), Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRUST 
COMP ANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Re-
spondent. 
[1] Assignments-Formal Requisites-Written Assignments-Ef-
fect of. Power of Attorney-,-Failure to Name Assignee.-A 
written instrument stating that the undersigned" hereby as-
signs and transfers" all his right, etc., to an investment certifi-
cate is an effective assignment, notwithstanding a power of 
attorney therein authorizing an officer of a named company to 
act in place of the' signer, and notwithstanding the failure to 
name an assignee, where the assignee is clear from the instru-
ment read as a whole. 
[2] Id.-Formal Requisites-Consideration-Assignment for ,001-
lection.-An assignment of an investment certificate which 
provides that the assignee is to credit all proceeds received 
to the purchase price of a certificate sold by it is in essence 
an assignment for collection, and it vests the legal title in 
the assignee, with the right to sue thereon, whether or not 
any consideration is paid therefor. 
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Operation-Rights of Action-Action for Breach of 
Tmst.-An assignment of all of an owner's right, title and 
interest in an investment certificate without limitation, which 
empowers the assignee to apply all amounts received out of 
the property in a specified manner, is effective to pass to the 
assignee an accrued cause of action for breach of the trust 
indenture securing the certificates, where such indenture 
specifically provides that ownership of a secured certificate 
is a condition precedent to the maintenance of the cause of 
action. This is true notwith!;tanding a, provision for allowing 
a re-assignment upon determination by the assignee of his 
inability to collect further proceeds or upon demand of the 
assignor, where no such demand was made. 
[4] Id.-Operation-In General-Instrument as Oontrolling.-In 
determining what rights 01' interests pass under an assignment, 
the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is 
controlling. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Assignments, § 36; 2. Assignments, 
§§ 40, 78; 3a, 3b, 5. Assignments, § 54; 4. Assignments, § 48. 
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[5] Id.-Operation-Rights of Action-Accrued Causes of Action. 
An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action 
with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the 
assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and 
remedies incidental thereto. Unless specifically or impliedly 
designated, accrued causes of action arising out of an assigned 
contract, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass un-
der the assignment if they can be asserted by the assignor in-
dependently of his continued ownership of the contract and 
are not essential to a continued enforcement of the contract. 
But· the rule is otherwise as to an accrued cause of action 
which cannot be asserted apart from the contract out of 
which it arises or is essential to a complete and adequate en-
forcement of the contract. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of· Los 
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Reversed. 
Hill, Morgan & Bledsoe, Charles P. McCarthy and William 
L. Baugh, Jr., for Appellant. 
Burr & Smith, William H. B. Haymond and Phillip Grey 
Smith for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The 1fetropolitan Trust Company of 
California, as trustee, and the National Thrift Corporation of 
America, as trustor; entered into a written trust agreement 
under which the Trust Company was to hold in trust a fund 
as security for the bonds, contracts, certificates, and annuity 
agreements which the Thrift Company was selling as invest-
ments. The agreement required the Thrift Company to main-
tain in the trust fund an amount equal to not less than 110 
per cent of the total aggregate principal of the outstanding 
bonds and the cancellation value of the contracts and certifi-
cations, less the total amount of subsisting loans. It further 
required the trustee to identify and authenticate all bonds, 
contracts, certificates and annuity agreements issued by the~! 
rrhrift Company, provided that the latter was under no de-
fault known to the trustee with respect to the maintenance of 
the trust fund. 
In 1927 Ward Esplin purchased from the Thrift Company 
a $1,000 participation certificate, secured by the trust, and 
5. See 3 Cal. Jur. 277; 4 Am. Jur. 304. 
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identified and authenticated by the trustee. In 1932 the 
Thrift Company became insolvent and a federal equity re-
ceiver was appointed to take over the trust fund. On July 8, 
1933, Esplin entered into a written agreement with the Na-
tional Reserve Company of America purporting to assign· all 
his right, title, and interest in the participation certificate to 
the Reserve Company for the purpose of permitting the lat-
ter to collect the proceeds from the certificate for him. . The 
proceeds were to be applied by the Reserve Company as a 
cash credit toward the purchase of one of its own investment 
certificates by Esplin. The Thrift Company participation 
certificate and the purported assignment were then delivered 
to the receiver of the trust fund by the National Reserve Com-
pany. Since the value of the trust fund had fallen below· the 
110 per cent required by the trust agreement the liquidation 
value of the certificate was substantially less than the stated 
cancellation value. In 1936 the National Reserve Company 
instituted the present action against the Metropolitan Trust 
Company alleging that it had violated the trust agreement at 
various times by identifying and authenticating certificates 
issued by the Thrift Company with knowledge that the value 
of the collateral deposited in the trust fund was less than 
the required 110 per cent. Esplin was not joined in the 
suit. This actioll, for the benefit of plaintiff and all other 
holders of such contracts and certificates, is representative in 
character and seeks to hold the defendant trustee accountable 
for the difference between the actual value of the fund and 
the value at which it should have been maintained. 
At the opening of the trial it was stipulated that prior to 
the consideration of any other issue evidence should be taken 
to determine whether any right to sue upon the cause of 
action ever vested in plaintiff. After receiving evidence on 
that issue, the trial court found that Esplin had not assigned 
the certificate to plaintiff for a valuable consideration and 
that plaintiff was not the owner thereof. It also found. that 
the cause of action sued upon by plaintiff was never assigned 
or transferred to it by Esplin. The present appeal was taken 
from the judgment entered by the trial court pursuant to 
these findings. 
The issues are: (1) Did the instrument of JUly 8, 1933, 
constitute a valid assignment of the participation certificate 
by Esplin to plaintiff, vesting the legal ownership in plaintiff Y 
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(2) If so, did it transfer to plaintiff the right to sue for a 
breach of the trust agreement occu,rring prior to the assign-
ment? 
The written instrument of July 8, 1933, provided as fol-
lows:-
"WHEREAS, the undersigned hl:!.ving purchased of the 
National Reserve Company of America one of its investment 
certificates, hereafter referred to as certificate, and 
"WHEREAS, the undersigned is the owner of NA-
TIONAL - THRIFT CERTIFICATE #136B CLASS B 
SERIES F having an estimated value of $835.10, and herein-
after referred to as property, and 
"WHEREAS, the undersigned is desirous of having the 
cash value of said property applied, at the earliest possible 
moment, as a cash interest-bearing credit on said certificate. 
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration that National Re-
serve Company agrees to give an immediate conditional credit 
(not a credit on my certificate) of 100 per cent of the above 
estimated value, and of the company's further agreement to 
convert said credit to a cash interest-bearing credit on the 
certificate immediately as received by it in the form of cash 
or its equivalent in acceptable first mortgages, and that . it 
further agrees to immediately pass to the cashable interest-
bearing credit on said certificate all such amounts received 
by it from or out of said property; the undersigned hereby_ 
assigns and transfers, for the purposes hereinabove stated and 
for none other, all his right, title and interest of, in and to 
the hereinabove described property, and hereby constitutes, 
appoints and empowers any duly qualified officer of said Na-
tional -Reserve Company in his name, place and stead, and 
as his attorney in fact, for said purposes. 
"PROVIDED, that, at any time upon the determination 
and conclusion that it is or will be unable to collect further 
proceeds out of said property, said National Reserve Company 
may, or upon the written request at any time of the under-
signed shall, re-assign and transfer to the undersigned, said 
property depleted by the amount of the aforesaid receipts 
arising out of said property and credited as aforesaid to said 
certificate, whereupon this agreement shall become auto-
matically terminated and cancelled. 
"Executed and acknowledged by Ward H. Esplin. 
July 8, 1933." 
April, 1941.] NATIONAL R. Co. V. METROPOLITAN T.Co. 831 
[1] There is no basis for the trial court's finding that 
Esplin did not assign the ·certificate to plaintiff. The evi-
dence is -clear that Esplin signed the instrument. Its lan-
guage is that of an assignment, the granting clause rea.ding 
in part: " . . . the undersigned hereby assigns and trans! ers 
... all of his right, title and interest in and to the herein-
above property ... " (italics added), and it is not less an 
assignment because of its power of attorney provision. (Jack-
son v. Deatwille Holding Co., 219 Cal. 498 [27 Pac. (2d) 
643].) Read in its entirety, the instrument admits of no 
other construction than that plaintiff is the assignee despite 
defendant's objection that the instrument fails to name an 
assignee. Otherwise, for example, it would be impossible for 
plaintiff to re-assign the certificate pursuant to -the provision 
in the last .paragraph that" ... said National Reserve Com- , 
pany may . . . re-assign . . . said property.. . -". 
[2] The contention that the assignment is void for lack of 
consideration likewise cannot be sustained. Since the instru-
ment provides that plaintiff is to credit all proceeds received 
by it to the purchase price of an investment certificate sold 
by it to Esplin, the assignment is in essence one for collection. 
It is well established that an' assignment of a chose in action 
for collection vests the legal title in the assignee whether or not 
any consideration is paid therefor. In such case the assignee 
may maintain a sl1it thereon in his own name, even though 
the assignor retains an equitable interest in the thing as-
signed. (Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316 [33 Pac. 913] ; Mor-
rison v. Veach, 190 -Cal. 507 [213 Pac. 945] ; Cohn v. Thomp-
son, 128 Cal. App. (Supp.) 783 [16 Pac. (2d) 3641.) The 
instrument in question therefore constitutes a valid assign-
ment of· the certificate .to plaintiff. 
[3a] There remains the question whether the cause of ac-
tion for breach of the trust indenture passed to plaintiff- with 
the assignment of .the certificate. There is no limitation, ex-
press or implied, in the instrument to support the trial court's 
conclusion that the assignment was designed solely to au~ 
thorize the collection by plaintiff of such dividends as it 
might receive on the certificate through a liquidation of the 
existing trust collateral. Plaintiff is empowered to apply to 
the purchase price of its investment certificate on behalf of 
the assignor "all such amounts· received by it from or out 
of said [assigned] property". The words of the granting 
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clause in no way restrict the source of such collections. De-
fendants rely upon the introductory clause of the instrument 
_ which reads: "WHEREAS, the undersigned is desirous of 
. having the cash value of said property applied, at. the earliest 
. possible moment, as a cash interest-bearing credit on said 
certificate". (Italics added.) They urge that the term 
"cash value" refers to the cancellation v,alue of the certificate 
in liquidation and thus indicates that the assignment was 
,restricted to the collection of dividends in such. liquidation. 
The granting clause of the assignment, however, transfers all 
of Esplin's right, title and interest without limitation, and 
is controlling over ambiguous recitals in the preamble. (Bing 
, v. Bowers, 26 Fed. (2d) 1017.) Moreover, plaintiff as an 
assignee for collection should collect all amounts recoverable 
on the certificate, and the cash value of the certificate would 
therefore include not only the amounts available in the trust 
estate for its cancellation; but in addition, any amounts which 
may be obtained by bringing suit against one whose wrong-
doing has depleted the available funds and thereby reduced 
the value of the certificate. 
Defendants contend that the provision in the assignment 
which allows plaintiff to re-assign the certificate upon de-
termining that it is unable to collect further proceeds and 
enables Esplin to demand a re-assignment of the certificate 
at will indicates that the cause of action was' not intended 
to pass under the assignment. Esplin, however, has made no 
, such demand for re-assignment, and the provision limits only 
. the possible duration of the assignment and not the extent 
of the rights transferred thereby. 
The statement in the assignment that it was made "for 
the purposes hereinabove stated, and for none other" con-
stitutes not a limitation upon the rights assigned, but simply 
a requirement that the moneys collected be applied to the 
purchase price of the investment certificate as provided- in 
the first paragraphs of the assignment. The clause limits not 
what plaintiff may collect, but plaintiff's subsequent disposi-
tion of what is collected. 
[4] In determining what rights or interests pass under an 
assignment, the intention of the parties as. manifested in the 
instrument is controlling .. (See cases cited in 5 C. J. 949.) 
[5]. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in 
action" however, with no indication of the intent of the par-
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ties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and 
all rights and remedies incidental thereto. (See cases cited 
in 3 Cal. Jur. 277.) These incidental rights include certain 
ancillary causes of action arising out of the subject of the 
assignment' and accruing before the assignment is made. 
Unless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates 
them, accrued causes of action arising out of an' assigned con-
tract, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under 
the assignment as incidental to the contract if they can be 
asserted by the assignor independently of his continued own-
ership of the contract and are not· essential to a continued 
enforcement of the contract. (Regan Vapor~Engine 00. v. 
Pacific Gas-Engine 00.,49 Fed. 68, 1 C.' C. A. 169] ; Schaffer 
v. Vandewater ill 00., 160 App. Div. 803 [145 N. Y. Supp. 
769]; Wasson v. Taylor, 191 Ark. 659 [87 S. W. (2d) 63]; 
Fox v. Hirschfeld, 157 App. Div.364 [142 N. Y. Supp. 261]; 
Steele v. Brazier, 139 Mo. App. 319 [123 S. W. 477] ; Robin-
son v. Saxon Mills, 124 S. C. 415 [117 S. E. 424] ; Morris v. 
McOulloch,83 Pa. St. 34; [contra, Jackson v. Meinhardt, 99 
Cal. App. 283 (278 Pac. 462)].) 
If, however, an accrued cause of action cannot be asserted 
apart from the contract out of which it arises or is essential 
to a complete and adequate enforcement of . the contract, it 
passes with an assignment' of the contract as. an incident 
thereof. Thus, the assignm.ent of' a contract passes from as-
signor to assignee an accrued cause of action for rescission 
(Latimer v. Oapay Valley Land 00., ] 37 Cal. 286 [70 Pac • 
82] ; National Pacific Oil 00. V~ Watson, 184 Cal. 216 [193' 
Pac. 133] ; Sherman ·V. International Life Ins. 00., 291 Mo. 
139 [236S. W. 634]), or for reformation (Beck-Brown Realty 
00. v. Liberty Bell Ins. 00., 137 Misc. 263 [241 N. Y. Supp. 
727) ], and a creditor 'sassignee acquires the right to set aside 
a prior fraudulent conveyance by the debtor. (Emmons v. 
Barton, 109 Cal. 662 [42 Pac. 303] ; Billingsleyv. Olelland, 
41 W. Va. 234 [23 S. E. 8]2].) As a corollary,ifan assignor 
by express provision of a contract is denied the right to assert 
an accrued cause of action after he has assigned away his in-
terest in the contract, the right to sue passes to his assignee. 
There would otherwise be no one to enforce the right. 
[3b] The trust indenture, upon which the present action 
is based, specifically provides that ownership of a certificate 
secured by the agreement is a condition precedent to the main-
17 o. (2d)-27 
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tenance of a cause of action for violation of a covenant con-
tained therein. The assertion of the cause of action is thus 
dependent upon ownership of the certificate. All right, title 
and interest in such certificate has been assigned to plaintiff. 
Only by virtue of its transfer to the plaintiff could the cause 
of action continue to exist. Furthermore, plaintiff as an 
assignee for collection must secure the largest obtainable 
amount, and to the end of complete and adequate enforcement 
of the contract must be able to sue the delinquent trustee for 
a restitution that will enhance the value of the certificate. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Carter, J., Curtis, J., and 'Shenk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22, 
194L 
[L. A. No. 17756. In Bank.-April 24, 1941.) 
ADALYN B. BITTINQ.iE'R, Appellant, v. NEW YORK 
LIFE_ INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), Re-
spondent. 
[1] Insurance-Waiver or Estoppel-Acts Constituting-Accept-
anceand Retention of Premiums.-Any provision of a life 
insurance policy for immediate lapse upon non-payment of 
interest on a policy loan is waived by the acceptance of a 
premium payment. The company. cannot at the' same time 
accept the premium . payment and declare the policy lapsed, 
nor can it lapse automatically at that time. 
[2] Id.-Re-scission-Notice of Cancellation and Return of Pre-
mium-Nonacceptance-Reapplication of Dividend.~An at-
tempted rescission by an insurance company after the accept-
ance of a premium payment, by means of an offer to refund 
the premium paid in excess of the dividend (a minimum 
part of the premium payment), and an application of the 
dividend to the payment of texm insurance, is ineffectual 
where the refund was not accepted, and where the at-
-tempted reapplication of the dividend' was made not only 
2. See 14 Cal.' Jur. 439; 29 Am. Jur. 268. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Insurance, § 147 (5); 2. Insurance, 
§ 113; 3. Insurance, § 74; 4a, 4b, 40, 5a, 5b. Insurance, § 92. 
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without the knowledge or consent of the insured but also 
after his death. 
[3] Id.-The Contract-Interpretation-Duration and Termina-
tion of Risk-Automatic Term Insurance.~Under a provi-
sion in an insurance policy that in case of default in payment 
of premium or interest when there is a debt to the company 
insurance for a specified amount will· automl\tically continue 
as term insurance for such time as an excess of three-fourths 
of the reserve over the indebtedness will purchase, the Auto-
matic term insurance cannot extend the policy to a given 
date where notwithstanding the increase of reserve value as 
shown by the table, there is, by reason of interest, an indebt-
edness in excess of the reserve value, with the result that 
there is no surplus reserve on which to base any extended 
term insurance. 
[43., 4b, 4c] Id.-Premiums-Forfeiture for Nonpayment-Grace 
Period.-A provision in an insurance policy that if any pre-
mium or interest is not paid when due, the company will "re-
store" . the policy as of the date of nonpayment, .on payment 
within one month thereafter, does not, by the use of the word 
"restore," imply an immediate forfeiture. Although the lan-
guage is not that of the modern grace provision, it serves 
to prevent a lapse of the policy immediately, and extends its 
effectiveness for the period of one month. 
[5a,5b] Id.-Premiums-Forfeiture for Nonpayment-Necessity 
for Express Provision.-The rule that forfeitures· are not 
favored is particularly true of insurance contracts, and a 
forfeiture will be permitted only when expressed in the 
policy in clear and unmistakable terms. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Joe Crider, Jr., and Clarence B. Runkle for Appellant. 
Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and E. Avery Crary for Re-
spondent. 
CURTIS, J.---This is an appeal from a judgment in favor 
of defendant insurance company in an action by plaintiff, 
. as beneficiary under a life insurance policy, to recover the 
death benefit provided therein. 
On April 1, 1905, a $20,000 life insurance policy was issued 
by respondent company on the life of appellant's husband. 
